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FOREWORD
When U.S. forces departed Iraq at the end of 2011,
they left behind unresolved problems relating to that
country’s governance, notably concerning the relationship between the federal authority in Baghdad
and the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) in the north. Today, disputes over the territorial delineation of the KRG remain a source of tension,
while the discovery of significant reserves of oil and
gas within and straddling the borders of the KRG has
raised the stakes. Tensions have been heightened still
further by the determination of the KRG authorities
to pursue an energy policy independent of the central
government. This has involved entering into lucrative
energy exploration and exploitation agreements with
a number of major energy companies, among them
the U.S.-based ExxonMobil and Chevron, and moving
ahead with an energy partnership with neighboring
Turkey involving the construction of direct pipelines
across their shared border. Baghdad regards these activities as illegal, and fears that they could be a precursor to Kurdish independence and a break-up of the
country. Baghdad also resents Turkey’s role in these
developments, which has added to the tensions between these two countries that had already emerged
as a result of the increasing authoritarianism and
Shia sectarianism of the Iraqi government of Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
This monograph, authored by Mr. Bill Park, seeks to
explore the ramifications of these developments, both
for the region and for U.S. policy and interests. Turkey is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
ally, Iraq is a legacy of U.S. policy, and Washington
was, in many ways, the midwife for the KRG’s initial
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emergence and subsequent growth. Furthermore, U.S.
energy companies are now centrally involved in the
evolution of the region and its relationships. Thus, the
United States cannot remain indifferent to the march
of events in and around Iraq and, whether it likes it
or not, will be held at least partly responsible for the
outcome. While this monograph makes a contribution
to the ongoing debate about the legacy of the past U.S.
approach to Iraq, it also performs the valuable service
of bringing up to date developments in the region
subsequent to the U.S. military withdrawal. To that
end, the monograph throws the recent Syrian uprising
into the mix. This has intensified sectarian divisions in
the Middle East, further pitted Ankara against Baghdad, and additionally raised the specter of the Kurdish question. It has also brought about the deployment
of NATO Patriot anti-air batteries into Turkey’s southeast, and thrown an additional spotlight on Washington’s relationship with its NATO ally, Turkey.
Syria’s Kurds are currently seeking to carve an autonomous zone out of that country’s chaos, which has
aroused the interest of Iraq’s Kurds and is profoundly
worrying the Turks. Ankara fears that a Syrian Kurdish zone could serve as a refuge and base for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), weaken the opposition to
Assad, complicate any post-Assad settlement in Syria,
and altogether make it harder to keep a lid on its own
Kurdish problem. Indeed, Ankara’s latest effort to resolve its domestic Kurdish difficulties is surely linked
to events in neighboring Syria and Iraq. Thus, Mr.
Park’s monograph is also a study of the geopolitical
ramifications of a Kurdish bid for self-determination,
and offers insight into the current struggle in Syria.
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Mr. Park’s timely monograph addresses a plethora of issues that are vital to a range of U.S. interests,
and to the debate over the legacy and purposes of
U.S. policy.
		
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq at
the end of 2011 left behind a set of unresolved problems
in the relationship between the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG), and the Federal Government in
Baghdad—notably relating to the disputed boundaries of the KRG, and the extent of its autonomy. Tensions have since been compounded by the discovery
of significant quantities of oil and gas in the KRG area,
and Erbil’s pursuit of an energy policy independent
of and in opposition to Baghdad. Turkey, uneasy with
the increasingly sectarian and authoritarian flavor
of the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, has
since moved closer to the KRG, not least with respect
to energy issues. This has deepened Turkish-Iraqi
tensions still further.
Added to the mix is the increasingly sectarian
stand-off in the region as a whole, in large measure as
a consequence of Syrian developments, which has further pitted Ankara against Baghdad and its ally, Iran;
and the emergence of a bid for autonomy by Syria’s
Kurds, which has complicated the stance of both Ankara and Erbil towards Syria and towards each other.
Washington is in danger of being left behind by the
fast-paced events in the region, while the ethnic Kurds
of the region may be approaching a decisive moment
in their long struggle for self-determination.
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TURKEY-KURDISH REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
AFTER THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ:
PUTTING THE KURDS ON THE MAP?
INTRODUCTION
During a question-and-answer session with bureau chiefs in Ankara in early February 2013, the U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey Francis J. Riccardione referred
to “a lot of divergence” between Washington and Ankara with respect to policy towards Iraq.1 In this, he
was reflecting a growing and increasingly transparent U.S. unease with the close relationship that has
evolved between the Turkish government on the one
hand and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
of northern Iraq on the other, coupled with and not
unrelated to the ever-more fraught relationships that
each has with Iraq’s central government in Baghdad.
Ambassador Riccardione expressed American fears
that, “if Turkey and Iraq fail to optimize their economic relations. . . . There could be more violent conflict in Iraq and the forces of disintegration within Iraq
could be emboldened.” He declared that “a strong
Iraqi-Turkish relationship” would be the “optimum
outcome” not only for Iraq and Turkey, but for the
United States and for the entire region. As a treaty ally
of Turkey, friend of the KRG, and as “a partner and
non-treaty ally with Iraq,” a closer relationship between Turkey and the whole of Iraq is very much an
American interest too, and Riccardione made it clear
that Washington is endeavoring to persuade Ankara,
Baghdad, and the KRG of the mutual benefits of such
an outcome. Washington would not interfere or act as
an intermediary, but it would “offer confidence and
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support.” The ambassador concluded that, together,
Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil (the KRG’s capital) “will
profit very greatly. Separately, there are great risks
and great dangers.”2
Energy issues featured strongly in Riccardione’s
remarks, as they do in the three-way Ankara-ErbilBaghdad relationship. As a necessary means to achieve
what he insisted are the shared interests of all three, he
asserted that it is vital that Iraq’s feuding political factions agree on a federal hydrocarbons law that would
set the terms for the development of Iraq’s rich energy
resources, and for the distribution of its proceeds. This
would give impetus to Iraq’s still-shaky economic reconstruction and political stability, and would enable
Turkey to have access not just to the estimated 20 percent of Iraq’s oil and gas that is located in the Kurdish
region, but to the resources of the entire country. It
would also enable Turkey to “become a strategic alternative, for all of Iraq, to the straits of Hormuz in
getting Iraqi oil and gas out to world markets.”3 This
in turn would require the construction of new pipelines that could carry energy from Iraq’s fields directly
into Turkey, and would reduce vulnerability to any
disruption of the “strategic chokepoint” of Hormuz.
Turkey and all Iraqis would be the beneficiaries. Indeed, Turkish businesses of all kinds would benefit
from greater access to the entire Iraqi economy.
However, the ambassador’s comments appear
more wishful thinking than realistic analysis. AnkaraBaghdad relations have gone from bad to worse since
the end of 2011 with the U.S. military withdrawal
from Iraq. Riccardione’s comments, which accurately
reflect both the perspective and anguish that currently characterizes Washington’s view of Iraq, were
delivered against the background of yet another illtempered exchange of insults between Ankara and
2

Baghdad, in which Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu accused Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki of “trying to cover up his failure” by again alleging that Turkey was interfering in Iraq’s domestic
affairs.4 Erbil-Baghdad relations have also deteriorated since the end of 2011. Within days of the sensitive Ankara-Baghdad exchange, the Iraqi parliament
failed to agree on a national budget as a consequence
of differences with Erbil over payments to the KRG
for its oil production, a spat rooted in the absence of
an agreed national framework for the development of
Iraq’s hydrocarbons sector.5 In fact, and notwithstanding Washington’s preferences, there is little prospect
of a new Iraqi hydrocarbons law appearing over the
horizon. Progress on this stalled over 6 years ago, due
chiefly to disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil,
and in 2007 the KRG pushed ahead with its own hydrocarbons legislation.6 Within days of Riccardione’s
warning, Iran delivered a similar message—not to risk
the break-up of Iraq by developing too close a relationship with Turkey—to a visiting delegation from
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is the
closest to Iran of the KRG’s two ruling parties.7 There
appears to be a surprising degree of alignment between Washington and Tehran with respect to Iraq—a
point made by Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Namik
Tan when he noted that “the rhetoric of the U.S.
sometimes resembles that of Iran.”8 Washington thus
finds itself more in tune with the perspective of an
increasingly centralized, authoritarian, sectarian, and
Iranian-aligned regime in Baghdad than with those of
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally
Turkey or of Erbil.
In fact, alongside or subsequent to the withdrawal
of U.S. combat troops from Iraq at the end of 2011,
there have been a number of developments which,
3

taken together, are profoundly altering the three-way
relationship between Turkey, the KRG, and the federal government in Baghdad. One of these developments is the remarkable transformation of the relationship between Turkey and the KRG. The shift from
Ankara’s earlier hostile approach to Erbil towards a
close economic, political, and even strategic embrace
of the KRG began to emerge in 2008-09, before the U.S.
troop withdrawal, and has since gathered additional
momentum. A second development has been the pronounced cooling of the relationship between Ankara
and Baghdad’s Shia-dominated government. This is
largely a consequence of the increasing centralization
of power in Maliki’s hands specifically, and Ankara’s
belief that Maliki’s actions are serving only to destabilize and divide Iraq further. Turkey is also uneasy at
the extent of Iranian influence in Baghdad.
Perhaps more predictably, the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad has further deteriorated
since 2011. Iraq’s 2005 constitution, largely drawn up
under the supervision of U.S. officials, left numerous
loose ends in place. Most notably, both the degree
and nature of Erbil’s autonomy from Baghdad and
the future of the so-called “disputed territories,” including the oil-bearing city of Kirkuk but also tracing
much of the entire border, or “green line,” between
Arab Iraq and the KRG, were left decidedly vague. Yet
these territories are largely under Kurdish control, in
part as an outcome of the relationship between U.S.
forces and the Kurds in the immediate aftermath of
the 2003 invasion. Iraqis have proven to be incapable
of resolving these differences. Indeed, the differences
have deepened. The KRG’s energetic attempt to develop its energy resources has further inflamed the
atmosphere. Erbil has entered exploration agreements
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with energy majors including U.S. based ExxonMobil
and Chevron as well as Anglo-Turkish Genel Energy,
French Total, and Russia’s Gazprom Neft.9 Baghdad
regards these deals as illegal, as it does Erbil’s export
of limited amounts of crude oil by truck. Turkey has
taken Erbil’s side in this dispute. Indeed, Ankara
and Erbil are cooperating on the construction of new
energy pipelines which will transport the KRG’s oil
and gas directly to Turkey, potentially bypassing the
existing Baghdad-controlled pipeline infrastructure.
If implemented, these developments will surely enhance the KRG’s scope for de facto economic and indeed political independence from Baghdad. Ankara’s
readiness to facilitate Erbil’s dynamic energy policy
has further contributed to the deterioration of its relationship with the federal government in Baghdad. The
energy factor has become key to Ankara-Erbil, ErbilBaghdad, and Ankara-Baghdad relations, and serves
to intertwine each of these relationships.
The final key development of note that has occurred since the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq
and that also threatens Ankara-Erbil-Baghdad relationships relates to the so-called Arab Awakening,
and particularly its manifestation in Syria. Turkey reacted to the increasingly fierce crackdown against the
opposition in Syria by lending its weight to calls for
the overthrow of the Damascus, Syria, regime, a move
that Damascus; Baghdad; and Tehran, Iran, have been
inclined to interpret in sectarian terms. As the Syrian
revolt intensified, Turkey’s concerns focused increasingly on the Kurds of northern Syria. Largely under
the guidance of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya
Yekitiya Demokrat—PYD), which Turkey believes is
aligned with its own separatist Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—PKK), Syria’s Kurds
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have established a degree of self-rule in those areas
in which they constitute the majority. Ankara fears
this could offer an additional springboard for Kurdish
terrorist attacks into Turkey, and that it might further
complicate its relationship with its own Kurdish population. Furthermore, Syria’s Kurds have kept their
distance from the main Syrian Arab opposition due to
its reluctance to agree to Kurdish autonomy in a postAssad Syria. The Iraqi Kurdish leadership, at least in
the form of its President Massoud Barzani, shares Ankara’s mistrust of the PYD, although it favors Syrian
Kurdish self-determination. In short, Syrian developments have underscored the sectarian dimension to
Ankara-Baghdad relations, and have further highlighted the anomolous position of the region’s Kurds.
These still evolving developments, and their interconnectedness, contain potentially serious implications for Washington’s regional policies and interests.
The United States generally enjoys close relationships
with Ankara, Erbil, and Baghdad—the KRG has surely
been the most pro-American entity in the region—and
will be hard pressed to avoid entanglement in the
complexities of their interactions. Some doubt that Baghdad and Erbil can resolve their differences without
external mediation, which Washington is best placed
to provide. KRG energy minister Ashti Hawrami has
called on the United States to mediate the hydrocarbons row between Baghdad and Erbil.10 Furthermore,
considerable political and moral hazard is lurking in
Washington’s postures towards the two governments.
Driven by its fears for Iraq’s stability and territorial
integrity, the U.S. tilt towards Baghdad is exasperating its Iraqi Kurdish friends and Turkey, and puts it
in opposition to the commercial behavior of some of
its own energy majors. Nor can Washington expect

6

to evade some political and moral responsibility for
the territorial tensions between Erbil and Baghdad.
Operations PROVİDE COMFORT and NORTHERN
WATCH, the U.S.-led no fly zones over northern Iraq
that commenced in 1991, helped create the opportunity for the formation of the KRG, while the U.S.-led
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 was
highly instrumental in enabling Erbil to consolidate
its autonomy and viability. Washington presided over
the drawing up of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, and the
subsequent course of the relationship between Iraq’s
Kurdish and Arab components suggest that it might
not be easy for the United States to detach itself from
the unresolved territorial and governance issues it left
in place.
Furthermore, the legacy of U.S. material and sometimes moral support for Turkey’s military campaign
against the PKK, and its palpable unease with the
possible course of Kurdish self-determination in Iraq,
can also appear to pit Washington against minority
rights in the region.11 Any post-Assad Sunni regime
that could emerge out of the present chaos in Syria
could well turn on its Christian, Druze, and Allawite
as well as its Kurdish minorities, adding further scope
for acute embarrasment to the mix. It is impossible to
hit the right diplomatic note given the region’s current
turmoil and tensions, but Washington needs to be on
guard lest its policies towards—or perhaps its exhaustion with and neglect of—this interlocking set of issues inadvertantly strengthen authoritarian and in some
instances anti-American regimes in the region, add to
sectarian divisions, undermine the development of
Iraq’s energy industry taken as a whole, upset its best
friends in the area, and permit unresolved issues to
build up pressures that could explode into violence.
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TURKEY AND THE KRG
Massoud Barzani, President of the KRG and leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), one of the
two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties that have carved up
governance of the KRG between them, has over the
years repeatedly referred to his aspiration for a fully independent Iraqi Kurdish state.12 Until relatively
recently such comments were greeted with fury in
Ankara, where Barzani was famously dismissed as a
“tribal chieftain.” The deep Turkish unease at the very
existence of the KRG, which could be a precursor of
a sovereign Kurdish state; the impact this could have
on Turkey’s own unsettled Kurds; and the belief that
the KRG was enabling cross border raids into Turkey
by PKK fighters based in the Iraqi Kurdish mountains,
have in the past all fed Ankara’s hostility. The enlargement of the KRG’s territory to incorporate oil-rich
Kirkuk was also a Turkish “red line,” as it was feared
this could vastly improve the viability of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey also championed the Turkmen population of Kirkuk in order to muddy Kurdish
claims to the region.13 Ankara shunned direct contact
with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. Indeed, former
(2000-07) Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer even
went so far as to refuse to receive his Iraqi counterpart, Jalal Talabani, on the grounds of his concurrent
leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan’s other major political
party, the PUK.14
Some leading figures in Turkey’s policymaking
elite grew increasingly frustrated by this situation.
They recognized that the KRG had become a fixture in
the region, that it had Washington’s blessing, and that
its cooperation would be useful in Turkey’s struggle
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with the PKK, given the latter’s use of bases located
within KRG territory. Furthermore, Turkey’s decades-old militarized approach to its domestic Kurdish
problem had not succeeded and showed few signs
of doing so. They were also frustrated with the slow
political progress in Baghdad and, as time passed, its
uncertain political sympathies and alignments. Murat
Ozcelik, who had served as Ankara’s Special Envoy to
Iraq until his appointment as Ambassador to Baghdad
in 2009, was one such player. There were circles within Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (Milli
Istibahrat Teskilati, or MIT), such as Emre Taner who
became head of the organization in 2005, who similarly sought a change in Ankara’s approach. In Erbil,
too, some key players were increasingly writing off
Baghdad as either an effective or benign political partner, and were on the lookout for alternative sponsors.
President Massoud’s nephew and now the KRG’s
prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani, and Barham Salih
of the PUK were early proponents of rapprochement
with Turkey.15
On both sides, such rethinking was given additional impetus as U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq
approached. However, nationalist sentiment in Turkey, embraced by many in its ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) as well as in the bureaucracy
and the population at large, made any such policy
shift difficult to effect. Chief of the General Staff Yasar
Buyukanit (from 2006 until August 2008) was a formidable obstacle to any significant reconsideration of
Turkish policy towards the KRG. In contrast, his successor, General Ilker Basbug, shared some of the frustrations of the “forward group” in Ankara and proved
far more amenable to a change of tack.16 More recently, the military’s fall from grace as a political player
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in Ankara, as a consequence of ongoing investigations
into its past political activities and of the JDP’s unprecedented dominance of the Turkish political scene,
have in any case downgraded its capacity to influence
Turkish policy.
Yet into 2007 and beyond, the predominant sentiment in Ankara was that the KRG was harboring
PKK terrorists and that if neither Erbil or Washington would act against the PKK in their northern Iraqi
hideouts, then Turkish forces should be unleashed
against them, as they had been throughout the 1990s.
Matters came to a head in late-2007 when a PKK attack launched from across the Iraqi border resulted
in the deaths of 13 Turkish soldiers. Given the highly
charged Turkish atmosphere that ensued, the administration of George W. Bush saw little option but to
give the green light to a resumption of cross-border
air and ground raids by Turkish security forces, and
to facilitate them with the provision of real-time intelligence.17 Turkey had been denied this option since the
2003 invasion had landed Washington with responsibility for Iraq’s security. With the November 2007 understanding, the post-invasion downturn in U.S.-Turkey relations came to an end, and the relationship has
been on an upswing almost continuously since. More
immediately, however, a substantial Turkish ground
incursion in February 2008, named Operation SUN
(Gunes), produced a confrontation with Iraqi Kurdish
forces and American pleas to limit the scale and duration of the operation.18 Barzani, suspecting the real target was the KRG itself, threatened armed retaliation
against Turkish forces.19 Accompanied by unconvincing denials that it was as a consequence of American
pressure, the Turkish force somewhat precipitously
withdrew. The PKK remained intact and may even
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have been emboldened. These events may have further convinced Ankara of the desirability of engaging
with Erbil rather than seeking to intimidate it.20
Following informal contacts with Barzani in late2008, the first high level contact he had had with Turkish officials in 4 years, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s October 2009 visit to Erbil paved the
way for an intense round of diplomacy and high level
visits between Turkey and the Kurdish “quasi-state,”21
leading to the opening of a Turkish consulate in Erbil
in 2010. The relationship has subsequently been fully cemented. As just one indication of how Turkey’s
recalibration of its approach has gone, in his Kurdish
New Year (Newroz) address delivered in March 2012,
Barzani once again hinted that the time for Iraqi Kurdish self-determination might be drawing closer. He
cited the factional infighting in Baghdad and the disregard there of Iraq’s constitution, not least with regard to the resolution of the disputed territories.22 Article 140 of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, which promised
the holding of a census and referendum on Kirkuk’s
future, has not been implemented. The referendum
was initially earmarked to take place in 2007, but has
been put off indefinitely by Baghdad. Most observers
anticipate that a referendum would confirm the desire
of a majority of the region’s inhabitants to be incorporated into the KRG. For Barzani, Baghdad’s obstructiveness on this issue now combined with Maliki’s
undemocratic, sectarian, centralizing, and unconstitutional behavior, to encourage a reconsideration of the
Kurdish commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity and
federative structure.23
Yet Barzani’s comments provoked barely a murmur from Ankara. In fact, in April, just weeks after
he made them, he was given the red carpet treatment

11

during a trip to Turkey, where he met with the Republic’s president, prime minister, foreign minister and
intelligence chief. So far has the relationship now travelled that 2 years later, in the autumn of 2012, President Barzani was an honored guest at Turkey’s ruling
JDP convention. It is evident that Ankara has come to
regard Barzani in particular as a trusted partner and as
a leader with political and personal integrity and deep
roots in his community.24 Enthusiasts for the relationship on the Kurdish side, such as KRG Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani, now use the term “strategic” to
describe their relationship.25 Turkey’s once menacing
policy of keeping the KRG at arms lengths has melted away. Ankara seems to have dissolved some of its
own “red lines.”
There are additional factors behind this paradigm
shift in Ankara’s relationship with the KRG. The
growth of cross-border trade predated the improvement in the political atmosphere, and dates back at
least to the lifting of sanction on Iraq following the
overthrow of the Ba’athist regime. Although available figures vary slightly, trade with the KRG now accounts for well over half of Turkey’s trade with Iraq
as a whole, which is Turkey’s second or third largest
trading partner. Up to 80 percent of Turkish exports
to Iraq are to the KRG, and around 80 percent of consumer goods available in the KRG are of Turkish origin. Tens of thousands of Turkish citizens work or
have established businesses in Kurdish Iraq, many of
them Turkish Kurds. Indeed, the potential economic
benefits of the KRG’s booming economy to Turkey’s
impoverished and predominantly Kurdish-inhabited
southeast is not lost on Turkey’s ruling JDP, which is
engaged in a competition for votes in the region with
the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Baris ve
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Demokrasi Partisi—BDP). Almost half of all businesses
established in the KRG originate in Turkey. Turkish
companies are heavily engaged in construction, engineering, transportation, retail, banking, other areas
of the service sector, and, of course, energy. Turkish religious groups have established schools and a
university in the region.
Turkish foreign policy has followed its trade patterns and reflects the importance Turkey’s current
government attaches to “soft power” as an instrument
or precursor to its influence. It also constitutes an expression of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero
problems” and dialogue-based approach to neighborhood diplomacy. Indeed, his May 2009 elevation
to that post was itself a factor in Turkey’s apparent
paradigm shift in its approach to the KRG, although
he was already a prime foreign policy mover in his
former position as Prime Minister Erdogan’s foreign
policy advisor. All in all, the KRG is on the way to
becoming part of a Turkish “near abroad,” politically
and economically. Some might regard this as a manifestation of Turkey’s “neo-Ottoman” bid to establish
itself as a key regional player.
Ankara has also come to appreciate that prospects
for its struggle with the PKK and for its bid to win the
hearts and minds of Turkey’s Kurdish voters might be
enhanced by Erbil’s cooperation. In his April 2012 trip
to Turkey, Barzani reiterated his frequently-voiced
call for the PKK to end its armed campaign, promised to pressure the PKK to end its cross-border raids
into Turkey, and declared that he “will not allow the
PKK to prevail in the [KRG] region”26—all music to
Ankara’s ears, although it was hardly the first time
Turks have heard such utterances from Iraq’s Kurdish leaders. Both the PKK and the BDP immediately
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warned Barzani against involving himself in Turkey’s
Kurdish problem on behalf of Ankara, seeking to
downplay the impact his intervention might have.27
Barzani and other Iraqi Kurdish leaders have also
declared their support for the dialogue between Ankara and Turkey’s Kurds that has emerged in recent
months. This follows the failure of the 2009 initiative
to address politically Turkey’s Kurdish problem that,
by 2011, had run into the ground.28 The more recent effort has involved engaging with the jailed PKK leader
Abdullah Ocalan, but Turkey presumably hopes that
the soothing words of Iraq’s Kurdish leaders will also
hold some sway.
For its part, the KRG leadership certainly wishes
to minimize the PKK’s provocations against Ankara
(and Tehran) launched from KRG territory, and to see
an end to Turkey’s raids into KRG territory in pursuit
of PKK targets. It has long been a Turkish demand
that the KRG authorities take military steps to expel
or weaken the PKK fighters based in northern Iraq,
and the Iraqi Kurdish failure to comply has for just as
long been a source of frustration to Turkey. However, Ankara now appears to have concluded that it is
unreasonable to expect the KRG to be willing or even
able to physically confront PKK forces in their remote
hideouts in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq.
Iraqi Kurdish appeals to the PKK to end violence, their
silence in the face of Turkey’s cross border raids, and
any intelligence and other assistance made available
to Turkey’s security forces, now seem to be sufficient
if not entirely satisfactory to Ankara.29
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TURKEY AND BAGHDAD
Along with Barzani, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki was also invited to the JDP’s autumn 2012
convention. Unlike Barzani, Maliki chose not to attend,
which symbolized the cooling of the Ankara-Baghdad
relationship. This is not a development Ankara had
intended. Even as it moved closer to Erbil, Ankara’s
overall stance towards Iraq remained what it had been
since 2003—to shore up Baghdad, partly in order to
minimize the scope for Iraqi Kurdish independence,
but also in the hope of stabilizing Iraq and countering
Iranian influence there. From the very beginning, Ankara regarded full Sunni Arab engagement with Iraq’s
political reconstruction as a vital means to these ends.
Thus, it was instrumental in limiting the Sunni boycott of the 2005 elections, and in coaxing Sunni participation in the 2009 provincial and 2010 parliamentary elections in Iraq. Ankara had since 2003 sought to
cultivate relationships with all the country’s factions,
including the Sadr Movement, which although Shia
and close to Iran is also lukewarm towards Maliki and
in favor of greater Shia-Sunni unity in Iraq. In 2008,
Ankara and Maliki’s first government agreed to establish a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, and
bilateral trade and political dialogue between the two
capitals grew apace. In the 2010 elections, Ankara’s
preference for the Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya non-sectarian bloc was clear, perhaps inadvisably so, given
the eventual outcome. Although Allawi’s bloc gained
the (marginally) largest share of the popular vote and
of parliamentary seats and did indeed attract large
Sunni but also Shia and even Turkmen support, it was
Maliki who eventually emerged at the head of a coalition government in December 2010. Turkey’s aim
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was to encourage power-sharing, good governance,
economic reconstruction, and stability in Iraq, not to
favor one faction over another. Furthermore, its Iraq
policy fitted with its wider endeavor to forge a more
active and cooperative role in the region.30
Yet, despite these efforts, by January 2012 Maliki
was condemning Turkey’s “interference” in Iraq’s affairs after Prime Minister Erdogan had warned him
against stoking sectarian divisions in the country.
Erdogan’s intervention had been prompted by the
attempted arrest of Iraqi’s Sunni Vice-President Tariq
al-Hashemi on the very day that U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta was overseeing the formal end of
the American military presence in Iraq. The war of
words between Baghdad and Ankara continued to
deteriorate, particularly once Hashemi was granted
protection by Turkey, after first receiving sanctuary
in Iraqi Kurdistan.31 Maliki described Turkey as “hostile” towards Iraq and accused Ankara of pursuing
a sectarian agenda.32 For his part, Hashemi declared
that “hopes for early political solutions no longer exist” in Iraq,33 for which he laid the blame at Maliki’s
door. Turkey’s perspective accords with Hashemi’s.
Hashemi has also insisted that the refuge Ankara had
offered him was based not on sectarian considerations but as a result of Turkey’s commitment to Iraqi
democratization.34 He subsequently has been given
five death sentences in absentia by Iraqi courts on
terrorism charges.
Relations between Ankara and Baghdad have
since progressively deteriorated. In January 2012, the
Turkish Embassy in Baghdad was subjected to a rocket attack. In May 2012, Baghdad called in Turkey’s
ambassador to protest that Turkey’s Basra and Mosul
consuls were meddling in Iraq’s domestic politics.35 In
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July 2012, Baghdad even threatened to report Turkey
to the United Nations (UN) Security Council for violations of Iraqi airspace as a consequence of Turkish air
strikes against PKK targets within the KRG area, an
activity which Iraq had hitherto generally tolerated.36
Similarly, in October 2012, Baghdad raised the issue
of the presence of Turkish military bases on Iraqi soil,
albeit within the KRG zone, an arrangement which
had long been tolerated by successive Iraqi governments.37 Baghdad even considered deploying nonKurdish Iraqi troops on the border with Turkey in
order to obstruct Turkish ground incursions.38 There
have also been persistent rumors that Erdogan promised Barzani that Turkey would offer protection to the
KRG in the event of an attack by Baghdad’s forces.39
The war of words between Ankara and Baghdad has
been given additional impetus by other developments
in the region, notably Turkey’s burgeoning energy
relationship with the KRG and events in Syria.
Maliki’s move against Hashemi, which included
the arrest or marginalization of other leading Sunni
politicians, appeared in Ankara as a challenge to power sharing and pluralism in Iraq, which Ankara sees
as offering the best hope for political stability in the
country; and as a Shia—and perhaps indirectly Iranian—bid for power and predominance in Iraq. Ankara
had long been anxious about Maliki’s centralizing,
authoritarian, and seemingly sectarian inclinations.
Maliki has progressively subverted or bypassed the
governing institutions put in place since 2003, and has
concentrated power in his own hands by, for example,
placing the military, the paramilitary special forces,
and Iraq’s national intelligence forces under his direct
control.40 Ankara has also remained close to some of
Iraq’s Sunni elements, including those like Hashemi
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who had come to favor greater regional autonomy in
Iraq as a counterweight to Maliki’s increasing autocracy.41 Nor is Turkey happy about the degree of influence it believes Iran wields in Maliki’s Iraq. In this
context, the arrest warrant for Hashemi represented
something of a last straw for Turkey. Turkish “zero
problem” diplomacy had collided with Iraq’s fractious, fragile, and sectarian politics, although trade
relations between the two neighbors have continued
to prosper.
ERBIL-BAGHDAD RELATIONS
More predictable has been the continuing tension
between Erbil and Baghdad. Although the Kurdish
bloc had supported Maliki in preference to Ayad Allawi’s bid to head the government and has held on
to key, if increasingly notional, federal government
posts (most notably Jalal Talabani’s incumbency as
president and Hoshyar Zebari’s as foreign minister)
before long there was mounting Kurdish frustration
with the Maliki government’s disregard for the power-sharing foundation stone of the coalition and for
the provisions of the constitution. In fact, Barzani had
played a key role in brokering the November 2010
deal, known as the “Erbil Agreement” that led to Maliki’s second spell as prime minister. This obliged Maliki to sign up to a 15-point list specifically designed to
limit his accretion of power, a trend that had already
been amply demonstrated during his spell as prime
minister before the March 2010 elections. Maliki has
subsequently almost entirely ignored the terms of
this agreement, although at the time of this writing, it
has as yet proved impossible to put together enough
support for a no-confidence vote in Iraq’s Council of
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Representatives. Barzani has repeatedly condemned
Maliki’s centralization of power and has especially
singled out his increasing domination of federal Iraq’s
security apparatus. He has criticized Washington’s
readiness to supply arms to Iraq’s military, especially
F-16s, which Barzani fears could be used against the
Kurds, and has explicitly supported autonomous arrangements for Iraq’s Sunni provinces.42 Barzani’s
April 2012 and subsequent threats to hold a referendum on Kurdish independence are a response to Maliki’s autocratic tendencies as much as or more than
they are a reflection of ultimate Kurdish aspirations.
Since the KRG came into being, a major source of
difference with Baghdad has been the KRG’s claim that
the governorate of Kirkuk and other heavily Kurdish
populated areas along the “Green Line” border with
the remainder of Iraq should be attached to the KRG.
The entry of the Kurdish peshmerga into many of these
areas ahead of or alongside U.S. troops in 2003, where
for the most part they remain, appeared to enhance
Kurdish prospects of success, as did the strong Kurdish political, administrative, economic, and security
presence that was soon established in these “disputed”
territories. Article 140 of the 2005 Constitution, which
the Kurds played a major role in devising and Sunni
Arabs almost none, undertook to “normalize” the disputed areas by reversing earlier “Arabization” programs. Recently settled Arabs would be encouraged
to return to their places of origin and displaced Kurds
and other minorities would be allowed to return. This
was to be followed by a census, which would pave the
way for a referendum to be held by December 2007.
Exactly which territories were disputed and who
had the right of return was left vague. In any case,
the federal government holds the responsibility for
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implementing these measures, and it has shown itself
unwilling to do so. Neither Erbil nor Baghdad appears likely to back down on its claim to these mixed
population areas.
Tensions between Kurds and local Arab, Turkmen,
and other ethnic groups in Kirkuk, the surrounding
countryside, and other disputed territories of mixed
demographic makeup remain high. Peace was initially
maintained by joint U.S. Army, Iraqi Army, and Kurdish peshmerga patrols, but cooperation broke down in
the wake of the American withdrawal. In the absence
of U.S. forces, the risk of direct confrontation between
the Kurdish security forces and those of other ethnic
groups or the federal government has become serious.43 The disputed areas remain a flashpoint, as most
recently evidenced by the violent clash between the
Kurdish peshmerga and Baghdad’s Djila, or Tigris, Operational Command. This unit was formed by Maliki
in mid-2012 in his capacity as Iraq’s Commander-inChief and justified on the basis of the requirement to
provide security in and around Kirkuk—or to provide
protection to Arab and other non-Kurdish communities from Kurdish forces in the area. This move was
interpreted by the Kurds as a challenge to their position, and they demanded the force to be removed
and disbanded. The pershmerga presence in the region
was augmented. A three-star U.S. General was highly
instrumental in defusing the tension, but Kurdish and
Iraqi federal forces remain in place and confronting
each other,44 as they do on the Syrian border following
a confrontation there in July 2012.45
Maliki argues that federal Iraqi forces have the
right and responsibility to ensure security for all Iraqis throughout the country, including in the disputed
territories and along Iraq’s international borders.
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This stance helps swing Arab nationalist opinion,
Sunni as well as Shia, to his side. Furthermore, Kurdish uncertainties about the outcome of a referendum,
and differences between the KDP and the PUK as to
which of them might take the lead role in various of
the claimed areas, has in practice dampened Kurdish
urgency. Furthermore, studies conducted by the UN
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which commenced in December 2007 but whose findings were
never made public, largely served to muddy the more
maximalist Kurdish demands.46 As a consequence of
these factors, no referendum has been held, and the
territories remain “disputed’—or, as Barzani and other Kurds prefer to call them, “detached.” Yet there has
been little tempering of Kurdish rhetoric in support of
their territorial claims, and Maliki’s unwillingness to
deliver the constitutional promises has been a major
factor in Barzani’s increasing frustration with Baghdad. The Kurds’ best opportunity to seize Kirkuk and
other disputed territories for themselves was in 2003
in the immediate aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion.
Now, in the absence of a referendum, the KRG cannot
acquire them by peaceful means and, with the passage
of time, the capacity of Baghdad’s security forces to
deny any forceful Kurdish acquisition of the territories may grow. Mooted U.S. arms sales will further
enhance Baghdad’s relative and absolute military capacity vis-á-vis Erbil. The territorial issue remains a
potential flashpoint.
In June 2013, Maliki paid a visit to Erbil in the latest attempt to patch up the government’s multifaceted
quarrel with the Kurds in the north. Barzani described
these talks as the “last chance” to resolve the differences between Erbil and Baghdad, and once again
appeared to threaten Kurdish secession should they

21

fail.47 The visit resulted in the establishment of seven
joint committees to address the energy, budgetary,
territorial, border crossing responsibilities, and other
differences that have brought Baghdad and Erbil to
the brink of armed conflict.48 The issues look intractable, and there seems to be little likelihood of an early
agreement, if any agreement at all.
THE ENERGY NEXUS: A GAME CHANGER?49
Kirkuk lies at the center of what was once Iraq’s
biggest oil and gas field and has been heavily exploited since its discovery in the 1920s and neglected as
a consequence of the more recent conflicts and sanctions. It nevertheless continues to hold considerable
reserves. The twin pipelines that transport oil from
Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean port at Ceyhan
are controlled by the federal Iraqi government. Repeatedly sabotaged, they are currently operating far
below capacity and are in dire need of refurbishment.
Although the Kurds have insisted that their claim to
Kirkuk and the surrounding countryside derives from
its historical association with ethnic Kurds and the
current demographic balance, Iraq’s Arabs and—in
the past—Turkey have been inclined to interpret the
Kurdish claim to the region as a bid to ensure the economic wherewithal for greater independence.
The current constitutionally-sanctioned arrangement is that the KRG receives 17 percent of Iraq’s national budget, which is roughly in line with the KRG’s
percentage share of Iraq’s population. As part of this
arrangement, any earnings from oil and gas fields
within the KRG’s territory should be transferred to
Iraq’s national budget. In practice, the arrangement
has been fraught with difficulty. In continuing dis-
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putes over both the KRG’s deliveries of energy and
over Baghdad’s liability to pay, Baghdad has repeatedly suspended payment, and Erbil has just as repeatedly suspended deliveries. Erbil’s resort to trucking
oil, at below market prices, across its borders into Turkey and Iran as a consequence of the payments dispute cannot serve as a long-term export solution for
the KRG, and even less so for those companies that are
or soon will be in a position to bring oil to the surface
from the substantial fields that have been newly discovered within the KRG’s borders. In any case, Baghdad regards these exports as illegal. Any payments
that Baghdad does make to Erbil—as a result of an
agreement made in September 2012, for example, but
one that soon collapsed—are intended to cover the
costs of exploration and production in the KRG’s new
fields, but not the profits of the oil companies there.
It is believed by the KRG that Baghdad should be
content with the dynamic approach adopted by Erbil
to the exploration and exploitation of new oil and gas
fields in territory under Kurdish control. Iraq’s total
national revenue would increase as the north’s energy resources are exploited and exported. However,
Erbil insists that it has the legal right to initiate the
development of new fields within the areas it controls,
and has signed around 50 so-called Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) with energy companies, most of
them small. The terms on offer theoretically permit the
international energy companies operating in the KRG
to retain around 20 percent of the profits, as opposed
to the 1 or 2 percent that Iraq’s fee-per-barrel-of-oilproduced service contracts might typically yield. The
estimates of energy reserves in the KRG area has substantially increased since Erbil decided to enter into
its own exploration agreements, and, when combined
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with the investment-friendly KRG operating environment, there has been no shortage of international energy companies prepared to take a risk against the uncertain political environment. Indeed, although such
estimates are notoriously varying and contingent, it
is possible and even likely that around 30 percent of
Iraq’s oil reserves lie in the Kurdish north of the country. If correct, the KRG alone would be the world’s
10th most oil-rich country (Iraq as a whole ranks second), roughly on a par with Nigeria or Libya. Its actual
production could very soon match that of Azerbaijan.
However, Baghdad’s interpretation of Iraq’s ambiguous and vague Constitution is that, as the federal
government, it alone has the right to enter into negotiations with international energy companies concerning the exploitation of Iraqi national resources. In part,
then, Iraq’s energy disputes can essentially be seen as
disputes about the nature of the country’s federal arrangements and the degree of its decentralization—or
even about Kurdish secession altogether. Baghdad’s
suspicions are strengthened by the fact that some of
the PSCs Erbil has negotiated cover territory that it
controls but that lie within the disputed territories
rather than within the KRG’s recognized boundaries. It is also concerned that the terms of agreements
entered into by Erbil are not aligned with those that
Baghdad negotiates. Baghdad’s response to what
it regards as the KRG’s illegal activities has been to
threaten to blacklist any energy company that does
business with the KRG from bidding for contracts in
Iraq’s larger southern fields.
This approach was fine when the companies doing
business in northern Iraq were small and unlikely to
obtain much of a stake in Iraq’s southern fields. However, the stakes were considerably raised as a conse-
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quence of the U.S. oil major company ExxonMobil’s
surprising decision in November 2011 to sign an oil
and gas exploration agreement with Erbil. Baghdad
was obliged to implement its threat by excluding Exxon from a bidding contest in Iraq’s southern oil fields
in retaliation, but for contractual reasons it could
do nothing about Exxon’s existing stake in southern
Iraq’s West Qurna 1 field. In a further blow to Baghdad, the exploration blocs that Exxon had acquired
in its 20-year deal with Erbil include fields located in
the disputed areas. Exxon is expected to start drilling
in mid-2013. Although in early-2013 it appeared that
Exxon might be prepared to sacrifice its agreement
with the KRG to exact a better offer from Baghdad
for its southern operations,50 the company has subsequently been reported as having entered into a KRG
exploration agreement with a Turkish partner.51 In
July 2012 ExxonMobil was followed by another U.S.
oil giant, Chevron, when it acquired an interest in two
exploration blocks in KRG territory; this was, in turn,
followed within weeks by the French oil major company Total and by the Russian company, Gazprom. Like
ExxonMobil these companies too seemed undeterred
by Baghdad’s threats to exclude them from contracts
in southern Iraq—in fact, Chevron has no stake in
Iraq’s south52 and has since acquired a third exploration block in the north.53 Doing business with the KRG
is far more lucrative and less frustrating than dealing
with Iraq’s federal government. It is also possible that
the oil majors have calculated that, in the longer term,
a deal between Erbil and Baghdad will be struck because the riches at stake are too high—this is certainly
the view of Tony Haywood, former British Petroleum
(BP) Chief Executive and now Chief Executive of Genel Energy, which is a major energy investor in Iraqi
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Kurdistan.54 They may also calculate that Iraq will find
itself unable to operate effectively without access to
the capital and know-how of the oil majors.
Turkey Eyes the KRG's Energy Resources.
BP’s recent expression of interest in reviving the
Kirkuk oilfield infrastructure is very much at the
mercy of the Kurds who, given the physical presence
of Kurdish forces and their substantial administrative control over the region, are well-placed to sabotage any initiatives from which they are excluded.55
Unsurprisingly, the KRG reacted negatively when in
January 2013, BP announced it would make an initial
short-term investment in the parts of the Kirkuk field
that lie within the formally Baghdad-administered
area, and that negotiations with Baghdad were still
ongoing.56 Erbil declared this step as “illegal and unconstitutional.” The KRG simultaneously defended as
legal and constitutional its decision a few days earlier
to permit Genel Energy to export oil to world markets
directly via Mersin in Turkey, bypassing Baghdad.57
Hitherto, trucked exports of crude to Turkey had been
in return for refined products, given the KRG’s lack
of refinery capacity. Baghdad’s reaction to Genel’s export venture was to threaten to sue the company and
to cut the KRG’s 17 percent share of Iraq’s national
budget,58 a move that the February 2013 debates surrounding the Iraqi national budget suggests would be
popular with Iraq’s Arab political leaders.
The KRG’s problem—and that of the companies
involved there—is how to export the oil and gas
which is now being extracted in limited quantities,
but production of which is scheduled to soar. In the
absence of a solution to this problem, the investments
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made by the energy companies will have been in vain,
and the energy reserves that have been discovered
there will remain unavailable to the world market. It
would be helpful if Erbil’s continuing legal and political differences with Baghdad over production, export,
and payment could be resolved by the time production begins apace in 2014. If these difficulties, and the
clashing territorial claims around Kirkuk, could be
settled, then a restoration of the Kirkuk infrastructure
and the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines—presumably with
BP as the most likely contractor—would be in Erbil’s
interest too. However, any such resolution appears
to be a very long way off. The KRG’s limited storage, pipeline, and refining infrastructure compounds
Erbil’s problem.
Given the fractious relationship with Baghdad,
access to Turkey’s market and its energy infrastructure presents itself as the more desirable option for
the KRG. Turkey is the most obvious export route for
Iraqi Kurdish energy, and its hunger for energy makes
it the KRG’s most obvious market. Kurdish oil and
gas would also feed into Ankara’s aspiration to develop as an energy hub. Genel Energy is the largest of
a number of Turkey-based companies engaged in the
KRG’s energy sector. More significant is the growing
involvement of the Turkish state. The direct exportation via Turkey of Genel’s crude oil could only have
taken place with Ankara’s approval. More dramatic
was the announcement in May 2012 of an agreement
between Ankara and Erbil, following a visit to Ankara
by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani59 and made
without Baghdad’s involvement, that two new pipelines could be constructed to carry gas and oil directly
across the border into Turkey.60 Although Turkey has
yet to formally commit to plans to run the pipelines
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directly across the border, they were first publicly announced by the KRG’s Natural Resources Minister
Ashti Hawrami at an energy conference in Erbil in
the presence of a large Turkish delegation headed by
Ankara’s Energy Minister Taner Yildiz. Baghdad was
not represented. In June 2013, Hawrami announced
that an oil pipeline from the KRG to Turkey would be
completed by September 2013, that the Anglo-Turkish
company Genel Energy would begin exporting oil via
the pipeline in 2014, and that gas exports to Turkey
would begin in 2016.61 The oil pipeline is planned to
reach the border alongside the Baghdad-controlled
Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline at Fish Khabur, into which
it could in principle feed in order that its throughput could be monitored by Baghdad. However, there
would also be the option of constructing an entirely
new stretch of line into Turkey, or joining it to the existing pipeline at a new monitoring station closer to
the Turkish border—which could be controlled by
Erbil rather than Baghdad—or even across the border
inside Turkish territory.62 Although the KRG section
of the pipeline is expected to be operated by Erbil, it
is also assumed that the Kurds will take only their 17
percent of the proceeds, and transfer the remainder
to Baghdad’s coffers. A feasibility study for the gas
pipeline has already been commissioned.63 There is
also the option of a reversible-flow pipeline that could
pump Kirkuk oil southwards to Basra, or southern oil
northwards to Kirkuk and on to Turkey, and some
limited pumping is apparently now viable again after
the damage caused by U.S. bombing and sabotage.64
In spite of this, Baghdad has invested little in developing this element of its infrastructure, notwithstanding Turkish expressions of interest in helping develop
Iraq’s north-south pipeline infrastructure.65
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It is possible that the new pipeline plans represent an attempt by Turkey to put pressure on Baghdad. However, there can be little doubt that Ankara is
frustrated with the slow pace of Iraq’s energy policy
and the absence of a federal energy law, and that it is
impatient to exploit the opportunities offered by the
KRG. As former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James
Jeffrey put it:
Sooner or later, hydrocarbons will be exported out
of northern Iraq. The question is whether that would
be done in cooperation with Baghdad, and thus
reinforcing the unity and federal system in Iraq, or
whether that would be done in another, maybe less
helpful, way.66

He went on to say, “A major reason behind the failure has been Baghdad’s lack of cooperation, including not paying the second [installment] of payments
to the companies in the north.”67 National elections
are due in 2014 and could be held earlier still. Barzani
has reportedly asserted that the Kurds of Iraq will go
their own way should Maliki remain in power after
2014.68 There is little reason to assume that the task
of assembling coalitions in Baghdad that are inclusive
of its sectarian and ethnic groups is likely to become
easier in the future. Iraq’s Sunni provinces might also
edge towards greater autonomy from a Shia dominated and centralizing Baghdad. When added to the
persisting sectarian violence in Arab Iraq, the omens
for the consolidation of Iraqi democracy and the establishment of stable governance are not good. Furthermore, Shia dominated Iraq’s increasing ties to Iran
are unmistakeable and possibly irreversible. In short,
reasons for optimism regarding Iraq’s future desirability as a regional partner, for Turkey or for Erbil,
seem somewhat thin.
29

The year 2014 coincides with the likelihood that the
oil majors operating within the KRG area will be ready
to export energy commercially. Only time will tell how
far Turkey is prepared to go in the pursuit of an energy relationship with Erbil which would both enhance
the KRG’s financial independence from Baghdad and
symbolize its political estrangement, but the clock is
clearly ticking.69 If, within a very few years from now,
Maliki or some other equally awkward political leader is in power in Iraq, a federal hydrocarbons agreement remains in abeyance, and Ankara (and Erbil) are
confronted with the choice of enabling the export of
commercial quantities of energy or of seeing the energy majors such as Exxon and Chevron wind down
their activities in the KRG, Turkey might take the risk.
Indeed, the exigencies of pipeline construction might
push them towards a still earlier decision.70 Energy is
now widely regarded as a truly transformative factor
in this three-way set of relationships between Ankara,
Erbil, and Baghdad. In essence, it has brought Ankara
closer still to Erbil, and distanced both from Baghdad.
There is an increasing sense that the KRG’s energy resources could propel profound geopolitical changes in
the region.
The Iraqi government clearly believes Turkey has
already gone too far in its relationship with Erbil.
Unsurprisingly, Baghdad reacted angrily to an unannounced visit to Kirkuk by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in August 2012. Davutoglu
travelled to Kirkuk directly from Erbil without first
informing the Iraqi government, according to Baghdad. Although the primary purpose of Davutoglu’s
trip was to meet with and reassure the city’s Turkmen population and thus could not be construed
as a show of support for Kurdish claims to the city,
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Maliki nevertheless accused Turkey of treating the
KRG as an independent state, and threatened a review
of Baghdad’s relationship with Ankara.71 In November 2012, Baghdad offered no explanation for its expulsion of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Turkiye Petrolleri A.O.—TPAO) from an oil exploration deal
in Iraq’s south.72 In the following month, Baghdad
even refused permission for the private jet carrying
Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz to land at Erbil
airport. Although it claimed the reason was technical, the incident came amidst reports that Yildiz was
about to finalize the pipeline deal with Erbil.73 The indications are that Erbil is already within Ankara’s, far
more than Baghdad’s, orbit, and that the likely future
direction of travel will cement this. What might be the
implications of this development?
WASHINGTON’S APPROACH
As already noted, the November 2007 agreement
between the Bush administration and Prime Minister Erdogan whereby Washington undertook to provide “real time actionable intelligence” in support of
Turkey’s attacks against PKK bases in northern Iraq,
heralded the warming of a relationship that had entered a deep chill since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq. The agreement served as a reminder to the KRG
that Washington’s relationship with Turkey enjoyed
high priority, and encouraged Erbil’s opening to Ankara. The December 2008 Status of Forces agreement
between the Bush administration and Baghdad led
inexorably to the end of 2011 withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq, after it had proved impossible to
agree on terms with Baghdad that would enable some
U.S. forces to remain. This intensified Erbil’s anxiety,
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especially given the unresolved differences between
Erbil and Baghdad over the disputed territories and
the nature of the Iraqi federation.74 Iraqi Kurdish unease had already been sparked by President Obama’s
November 2010 request that Iraqi President Talabani,
a Kurd, give up his post for Ayad Allawi to take over.75
Iraq’s Kurds detect the possibility that Washington
might sacrifice them, which would not be a new experience for them. Simultaneously, the likelihood
that a Shia dominated Iraq would move closer to Iran
made Ankara uneasy. These anxieties gave additional
impetus to the relaxation of Turkish-KRG relations,
as both parties sought to better position themselves in
what was seen as the void left behind by the American
departure.
Had Turkey and Iraq been able to maintain a
functioning relationship, the situation might have
been more manageable. Turkey could have offered
Iraq an alternative to political and diplomatic overdependency on Iran and a shared desire to limit the
KRG’s autonomy, while the KRG would have been
left in little doubt regarding its limited scope to pursue more expansive objectives. However, the political
and diplomatic fallout between Ankara and Baghdad,
the increasing energy significance of the KRG area,
and the sectarian rifts that have become ever more
evident in the region, have undermined the prospects
of such a benign outcome. These developments have
also demonstrated that Washington’s commitment to
Baghdad, notwithstanding Maliki’s increasing authoritarianism and sectarianism, and to combating any
apparent threats to Iraq’s territorial integrity, are no
less a determinant of the U.S. stance than its alliance
with Turkey and its residual and moral responsibility
to Iraqi Kurdistan. This has produced a somewhat un-
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anticipated situation in which Washington, which, in
general, is pleased with the Turkey-KRG rapprochement, is nevertheless uncomfortable with some of its
details and nervous about its possible implications
for Iraq’s territorial integrity and for the stability of
the region.76
This is most evident with respect to the KRG’s
energy deals. Washington has advised U.S. energy
companies that they should first clear with Baghdad
any agreements they might be contemplating with the
KRG, citing the legal uncertainty surrounding such
agreements, although Washington also insists that it
cannot directly interfere with commercial decisions.77
Furthermore, although Washington has been coy
about admitting it, the United States has been putting
pressure on Turkey to temper its energy relationship
with Erbil, reminding Ankara that its approach threatens to contradict Turkey’s own opposition to an independent Iraqi Kurdistan.78 The Turkish response is
that it cannot be expected to ignore the existence of
such considerable energy resources on its doorstep,
particularly in light of the fact that almost 50 energy companies, including a number from the United
States, are actively engaged there.79 Ankara also sides
with Erbil in rejecting Baghdad’s view that the KRG’s
energy deals with third parties, including Turkey and
the oil majors, are illegal.80 In effect, Washington is
now more concerned than is Ankara with the implications for Iraq’s territorial integrity of the KRG’s drive
to develop its energy sector.81
It is similarly noteworthy that the Obama administration appears determined to proceed with a major package of arms sales and training programs with
Maliki’s government, even though Sunni politicians
and even the then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James
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Jeffrey have expressed their disquiet.82 The deal includes the purchase of main battle tanks and 36 F16
fighter jets due for delivery between 2014 and 2018.83
President Barzani has expressed his fears that the
F16s in particular could be used against Iraqi Kurdistan, and believes Washington to be mistaken in its
continued support of the Maliki government.84 Although some have detected an element of hyperbole
in Barzani’s comments, there is some risk in Washington’s stance and some substance to Barzani’s concerns
given the current military standoff between Kurdish
and government forces around Kirkuk and elsewhere,
the unresolved political differences between Baghdad
and Erbil, and the long history of Arab-Kurdish conflict and violence in Iraq. Furthermore, Barzani’s comments were made in the context of a reported failure
to obtain the security guarantees he sought during his
April 2012 Washington visit.85
To some extent, Washington’s position might
be explained by a degree of inertia in the American
approach to Iraq. Although Iraq has not been a priority for the Obama administration, Washington has
embraced the legacy of the extraordinary U.S. commitment to Iraq of the recent past and has sustained
the direct personal relationship with Maliki.86 It has
seemed content to allow the inherited political commitment to the Maliki government to dictate its approach. In any case, there is a widespread view in the
United States that the KRG has achieved as much as
it can reasonably expect, and that independence was
not, and should not be, an option. Washington under
Obama also appears aware of U.S. limitations in Iraq,
and indeed in the wider region and beyond, is less intent on taking initiatives, and is particularly inclined
to take account of Ankara’s perspectives.87 Its behav-
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ior suggests a belief that there is little it can or should
do beyond encouraging dialogue and consensus, although it is highly likely that Washington is applying
pressure behind the scenes.
MOVING PARTS, UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS,
AND PARADIGM SHIFTS:
TIME FOR A STATE OF KURDISTAN?
However, the risks and opportunities in the region
are now looking profoundly different from what they
were at end of 2011. The Arab Spring, particularly its
manifestation in Syria, has introduced new and unanticipated elements into the already complicated
Ankara-Erbil-Baghdad triangular relationship. First,
the sectarian dimension of the Syrian turmoil, and the
manner in which this has both reflected and stoked
sectarian schisms in the wider region, have served to
deepen the rift between Turkey on the one hand and
Baghdad and Tehran on the other. Second, the position of Syria’s Kurdish minority, which amounts to
around 10 percent of its population, has added further
complexity to Turkey’s relationships with the KRG
and with its own Kurds, and has brought into greater focus the predicament of the region’s Kurds. Iraq’s
Kurds are at the center of this monograph, but their
fate is very much entangled with the fates of their
Kurdish cousins in Turkey, Syria, and, indeed, Iran.
In being denied a state of their own, the Kurds can be
said to have been losers in history’s evolution thus far.
Could this be about to change? Might the map of the
region be redrawn to accommodate a Kurdish state?
A number of seasoned commentators have ventured
the argument that the prospect of eventual Kurdish
independence has been strengthened immeasurably
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as a consequence of regional developments such as
those in Iraq and Syria.88 Even an Iraqi newspaper
editor said to be very close to Maliki has speculated
whether the time has come for a negotiated separation
of Arabs and Kurds in Iraq,89 while the U.S. National
Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030: Alternative
Worlds,90 published in December 2012, speculated that,
“in the event of a more fragmented Iraq or Syria, a
Kurdistan would not be inconceivable”91 and that this
would constitute a “blow to Turkish integrity.”92 Some
of this speculation relates to a Kurdistan carved exclusively out of Iraq,93 and some to the prospect of a wider
Kurdistan that might incorporate Turkey’s southeast.
Politicians and statesmen generally employ shortterm perspectives, but history unfolds over a longer
time scale, and involves dramatic change as well as
stubborn continuity. It can involve the rise and fall of
empires, the appearance and disappearance of states,
chaos, and degeneration as well as order and growth
and shifts in identities and perspectives. Time will tell
whether we are currently witnessing the prelude to
a changed order in the Middle East, and particularly
with respect to the fortunes of its Kurds.94 However,
Washington would be wise to think through the implications of a potentially profound reordering of the
region’s arrangements.
The Syrian Uprising, Sectarianism,
and the Kurdish Question.
Prior to the Syrian uprising against the Ba’athist
regime of Bashir al-Assad, which turned violent in the
first half of 2011, Turkey had warmly embraced the
Damascus regime, perhaps inadvisably given its poor
human rights record and Washington’s disapproval.
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Bilateral trade mounted, visa free travel arrangements
were put in place, and a host of other political, security,
economic, and social agreements were signed. A High
Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Damascus and Ankara held its first ministerial meeting in
October 2009. However, as Assad’s regime responded
to growing opposition with increasing violence, Ankara’s approach abruptly changed tack. Turkey was
disappointed that its Syrian friends did not heed their
advice to respond to the frustrations of the street, and
found itself confronted with a flow of refugees across
the Syrian border into a corner of Turkey that contains
significant Alevi, Alawite, Arab, and Kurdish minorities, thus threatening an overspill of Syria’s sectarian
and ethnic tensions into Turkey.95 The May 2013 car
bombings in the Turkish border town of Reyhanli that
killed 43 people seemed to confirm Turkey’s vulnerability to Syrian developments.96
Ankara was quick to take a leading role in the call
for the removal of the Assad regime. It sponsored the
formation in August 2011 of the Syrian National Council (SNC) and hosted it in Istanbul until it expanded
and reformed as the Syrian National Coalition in November 2012, basing itself in Doha, Qatar. The SNC is
closely linked to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) which is
largely formed and led by defectors from the Syrian
government’s armed forces. Until November 2012, the
FSA was headquartered in Turkey, where it is strongly
rumored to have received training and arms. Turkey
is also a leading light in the largely western Friends
of Syria group of countries. It joined the Arab League,
the European Union (EU), and the United States in imposing sanctions on the Damascus regime.
Following incidents of cross-border fire from Syria, in which two Turkish civilians were killed, and the
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shooting down of a Turkish fighter jet in June 2012,
Turkey not only shelled Syrian military positions but
also began calling for the creation of a “humanitarian
corridor” in northern Syria, as a safe haven for refugees but also as a base for the FSA. In October 2012
Turkey’s Grand National Assembly (NGA) voted to
give the government a 1-year green light to militarily intervene in Syria should it be deemed necessary.
However, once it became evident that the Assad regime was not going to crumble quickly, and also that
there was little support from Turkey’s NATO and EU
allies for intervention, Ankara found that its rhetoric
and behavior had left it in a somewhat exposed position.97 In December 2012, NATO acceded to a Turkish
request to deploy Patriot anti-missile systems close to
the Syrian border. Although Ankara has since had little alternative but to align itself with Washington and
with wider diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the
Syrian crisis, it continues to be at the forefront of calls
to arm the opposition and to establish a humanitarian
corridor. It is also accommodating an influx of Syrian refugees that numbered around half a million by
mid-2013.
One implication of the Syrian crisis has been the
resurgence of sectarian rifts in the region, which have
further damaged Ankara’s relationship with Baghdad
and, indeed, Iran. Iran has stood by its ally in Damascus, while Maliki too has expressed his pro-Assad sympathies. On both the Syrian and Iraqi issues,
Saudi Arabia and Qatar have lent their support to the
anti-regime side. Given the largely Alawite makeup
of the Syrian regime, and the essentially Sunni nature
of the opposition, the fact that Iran and Turkey found
themselves on opposite sides has—rightly or wrongly—been interpreted as suggesting that a sectarian
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undercurrent is now evident in regional diplomatic
alignments. Thus, a Tehran-Baghdad (and Damascus)
axis is pitted in opposition to a Turkey-Gulf Arab coalition. Turkey’s JDP government’s evident preference
for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood faction within the
SNC has added substance to these rifts.98 Ankara’s
2011 agreement to host NATO early warning radar
facilities as its contribution towards a ballistic missile
defense shield, widely seen as directed primarily at
Iran’s growing missile threat, was badly received in
Tehran, which sees the Patriot deployments in a hostile light.99 Given the Sunni roots of Turkey’s ruling
party, and the sense of exclusion felt by Turkey’s
substantial Alevi population, regional sectarian tension could have unsettling domestic repercussions in
Turkey also.
Syria’s minorities—Christians, Kurds, and Druze,
as well as Alawites and secular Sunnis—are generally
suspicious of the Arab nationalist and Muslim Brotherhood strands that appear to be dominant elements
in the opposition to the Assad regime. Many of Syria’s numerous Kurdish factions have come together to
form a Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has as
its key demand the establishment of a Syrian federation
to include an autonomous Kurdish region. Although
worried by the prospect of Kurdish secession in the
context of Syria’s turmoil, Ankara has sought to enlist
KRG President Barzani in its endeavors to persuade
the KNC to commit to the SNC. However, most of the
squabbling elements that make up the increasingly Islamic and Arab nationalist SNC are hostile to Kurdish
aspirations. In any case, Syria’s Kurds are almost as
divided as the SNC,100 and although their plight under
the Assad regime has been a far from happy one, some
appear to distrust the Syrian opposition to Assad as
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much or more than they distrust Assad, and they have
generally kept their distance from it.
Behind Ankara’s reasoning, and that of Barzani,
is the perceived threat posed by the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat—PYD), which
has stayed aloof from the KNC and is seen by Ankara and Erbil alike as Syria’s PKK offshoot. However,
the PYD appears to enjoy the support of the majority
of Syria’s Kurds, and boasts a powerful armed wing.
This has enabled the PYD to take control of most of
the heavily Kurdish populated areas of northern Syria, an outcome eased by the withdrawal of Assad’s
forces from the region at an early stage in the revolt.
Notwithstanding some clashes between the PYD and
pro-government forces in late-2012, and the PYD’s
demands for Syrian Kurdish autonomy, Ankara suspects that the PYD is in an alliance of sorts with the
regime, that the recent spike in PKK violence inside
Turkey was linked to Syrian—and Iranian—displeasure with Ankara’s opposition to Assad,101 and that the
prospect of a PKK haven opening up in northern Syria
is aimed at deterring Turkish involvement in Syria’s
domestic affairs.
Many Turks are convinced that Damascus resuscitated its support for Turkey’s Kurds in retaliation
for Ankara’s support for the SNC,102 with reports that
around 2,000 PKK fighters moved from northern Iraq
to the Syrian border with Turkey. As it is reckoned
that as many as one-third of the PKK membership is of
Syrian Kurdish origin,103 Ankara is obliged to take any
such developments seriously. After all, the Damascus
regime—especially in the form of Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafiz—has a track record of supporting and sheltering the PKK in its struggles against Turkey. Clashes
between PYD and anti-government forces that broke
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out in late-2012 and early-2013 might suggest some
credence to the Turkish view.104 However, it would
appear that the anti-government tribal Arab and
jihadist-inclined groups provoked the clashes, and that
they may have operated with the support of Turkey—
even crossing from Turkey to mount their operations.
Many Turks believe this; Syrian Kurds certainly do.105
Gradually, the Kurdish issue has emerged as an even
bigger worry for Turkey than the ongoing conflict
between Syria’s pro and anti-government forces. By
July 2012, Turkey’s prime minister was warning of the
possibility of Turkish air strikes against PKK elements
in northern Syria.106
Barzani shares Ankara’s distaste for the PKK and
PYD. He is keen to preserve his advantageous relationship with Ankara and to maintain the KRG’s economic progress, is irritated by the PKK’s presence in
northern Iraq, and appears to genuinely believe that
the JDP government in Ankara should be given the
benefit of the doubt with respect to Kurdish aspirations. On the other hand, Barzani has expressed his
support for the Syrian federation idea,107 and he recognizes the disadvantages that division carries for the
Syrian Kurdish cause. At a gathering of Syrian Kurds
in Erbil in summer 2012, he managed to broker a united front between the PYD and the KNC.108 His KDP
has also been engaged in establishing and training
a Syrian Kurds peshmerga that could form a fighting
arm for those elements of the KNC that look to him
for leadership. However, the PYD has prevented them
from crossing into Syria from their northern Iraqi bases, which is just one indication of how unsuccessful
Barzani’s efforts to forge greater Syrian Kurdish unity
have been.109 In May 2013, the PYD arrested 74 members of an armed pro-KDP faction that apparently
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did manage to cross into Syria. In retaliation, Barzani
closed the KRG-Syrian border.110 Skirmishes between
the PYD and other Syrian Kurdish factions have reportedly occurred on a number of occasions at least
since mid-2012.111
Despite these difficulties, the emergence of a Syrian “Kurdish question” and the interest Barzani has
taken in it has introduced a note of disquiet into Ankara-Erbil relationships. Ankara does not wish to see an
autonomous Kurdish zone in Syria, and is mistrustful of the role the Iraqi Kurdish leadership might be
playing.112 On the other hand, should Syria continue
its descent into “failed state” status, Ankara would
prefer a Syrian Kurdish entity that is under Barzani’s
influence rather than that of the PKK and its affiliates, and might welcome it as a buffer zone against a
chaotic Arab Syria—much as the KRG functions with
respect to Iraq. Should improvements in the circumstances of Turkey’s Kurds materialize, then enhanced
economic, social, and even political interdependence
with Ankara could prove to be an acceptable, and the
most beneficial, outcome for Syria’s Kurds. In short, it
is not unthinkable that Syria’s Kurds might arrive at
arrangements not dissimilar to those enjoyed by their
Iraqi cousins, with respect both to their relationship
with Ankara and with their Arab neighbors.
An Iraqi Kurdistan?
Perhaps the primary threat to the KRG’s current
status stems from its dependence on Baghdad for
around 94 percent of its budget.113 The resentment
shared by all the leading factions in Arab Iraq is putting at risk the KRG’s continued receipt of 17 percent
of Iraq’s national budget—in fact, it already receives
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rather less than that. There is little doubt that Iraq’s
Kurds could survive on far less, but there is also little
doubt that a reduction in this allocation would give
them pause for thought. Even so, how realistic is it to
suppose that the Kurds would step back from their
bid for maximum autonomy, given their experiences
of struggle and repression in Iraq? Could the KRG
leadership countenance the restoration of an Arab
military presence on KRG territory, and a disarming
or subordination of the peshmerga?
With respect to Kirkuk and other disputed territories, there are as yet few signs that Iraq’s Kurds
are prepared to forego their claim. However, Barzani
long ago softened the KRG’s position on its claim to
Kirkuk, at least rhetorically, by countenancing a power sharing arrangement for the city and its environs
and by agreeing to give serious consideration to UN
proposals for disputed areas of northern Iraq.114 However, there has been no progress on this issue, and it
remains an open question whether, over the longer
term, power sharing would work any better at the local level than it has at the national level. In any case,
would Baghdad become more accommodating rather than more assertive if the Kurds were prepared to
concede, and how might Kurds left on the “Arab” side
of the “green line” be treated? Also, given Baghdad’s
approach to the development of the energy resources
of Arab Iraq, is it reasonable to anticipate that Baghdad would adopt a more dynamic approach to the development of the north’s riches, if it was allowed the
capacity to do so? What can Kurds give to Baghdad
beyond supine appeasement, and what does Baghdad
want from Iraq’s Kurds beyond their subordination?
Of course, were Baghdad’s political processes to
produce a more reasonable leadership, then there
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could be stronger grounds for a more positive assessment of the future for Arab-Kurdish relations inside
a federal Iraq. Although all leading Arab Iraqi figures would seek to limit Kurdish autonomy, an improvement on the current atmosphere would surely
require Maliki’s removal and the reinstatement of a
power-sharing coalition in which the Kurds played
a full part—as was the original hope. However, it is
far from clear that this would produce anything other than resort to the blocking mechanisms, not least
by the Kurds, that have plagued post-Saddam Iraqi
politics from the outset. It would not follow that the
territorial differences or energy disputes between Erbil and Baghdad would be resolved, or even that tension surrounding these issues would be reduced. That
would necessitate a redrawing of the constitution and
would probably require external pressure and guidance—which is unlikely to be forthcoming, including
from Washington. On the other hand, a post-Maliki
coalition Iraqi government might win Turkey over to
a policy of re-engagement with Baghdad (and would
presumably have the opposite effect on Tehran). This
might in itself serve to isolate the Kurds, who once
again could find themselves with, according to their
proverb, “no friends but the mountains.” Optimists
about Iraqi politics—and at least in its rhetoric the
Obama administration should be so counted—would
presumably be content with such an outcome. But it
would fail to take account of Kurdish aspirations and
fears, or of Turkey’s energy ambitions.
More pessimistic scenarios posit little improvement
in Baghdad’s politics or in Arab-Kurdish relationships
in Iraq. If this stream of supposition proves truer, then
the spotlight will shine on Turkey particularly fiercely.
If Ankara continues to find itself faced with an unco-

44

operative, perhaps hostile and dysfunctional regime
in Iraq, how far would it go in its embrace of Iraqi
Kurdistan? In an interview with Time magazine in December 2012 in which he was questioned on the prospects for Kurdish independence, KRG Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani, believed by many to be the KRG’s
next leader, replied that:
first of all, we have to convince at least one country
around us. Without convincing them, we cannot do
this. Being land locked we have to have a partner, a
regional power to be convinced and internationally, a
big power to be convinced to support that.115

That “door of hope,” he said, “is Turkey. And if
that door, that hope is closed, it will be impossible
for us to surrender to Baghdad.”116 Nechirvan Barzani has been highly instrumental in engineering the
rapprochement with Ankara, but he is far from alone
among the KRGs, and especially its KDP, leadership.
Another leading KDP and KRG figure, Safeen Dizayee,
has said in an interview that “even if tomorrow when
there is a Kurdish independent state in Iraq, it would
be a dependent independent [country] whether on
Turkey, Iran, Syria or Iraq,” 117 and made it clear that
Turkey represents the preferred option. Falah Mustafa Bakir, head of the KRG’s Department of Foreign
Relations, is another leading KRG figure who pins
his hopes on the KRG’s relationship with Turkey.118
However, these KRG leaders understand that Turkey
is not ready and may never be ready to countenance
full Kurdish independence. They would also welcome a more accommodating regime in Tehran with
which they could constructively engage. However,
they all dismiss Baghdad as a fruitful partner, at least
given the current composition of its government, but
possibly existentially too.
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Ankara is clearly engineering an ever-closer relationship with the KRG, even while falling far short of
supporting its formal independence. The objective appears to be to create an economic, and indeed political, “interdependence” between Turkey and the KRG,
both because the KRG is a neighbor that possesses
energy resources and markets that Turkey needs,
but also as a means to lever Baghdad. If and when
Baghdad adopts a more constructive policy towards
the development of the KRG’s energy resources, then
Iraq would support rather than oppose the geographically and economically-determined export of northern Iraq’s gas and oil via Turkey119—an outcome that
would reflect American preferences. In other words,
the KRG and Turkey will economically grow together
in any case, not least via energy considerations. The
only issue is whether and when Baghdad will give
this development a green light. This, in turn, leads
back to the question of the future of Baghdad’s political processes, and raises the question of what Turkey’s
response would be were Baghdad to continue to be a
dysfunctional or hostile neighbor.
At present, Turkey’s expectations of Baghdad are
low. Furthermore, it has embraced the reality of the
KRG’s de facto independence and is maximizing the
economic benefit it can obtain from the situation.120
In aligning itself with the KRG on the issue of the legality of Erbil’s energy policy, including the export
of crude oil by Genel Energy, Ankara is also aligning
itself, and enabling, an interpretation of Iraq’s federalism that maximizes the KRG’s independence from
Baghdad.121 Turkey depends on imports for over 90
percent of its (growing) oil and gas consumption. Of
that, Iran provides around half of its oil and one-fifth
of its gas,122 and is the only neighboring country with
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which Turkey has a trade deficit. This degree of Turkish dependency on Iran is itself historically a function
of the U.S.-inspired sanctions on and wars with Iraq,
which had before the early-1990s been a more important trade partner for Turkey. Furthermore, Iranian
gas is expensive, Tehran has proven to be a difficult
trade partner, sanctions against Iran have put pressure
on Turkey to find alternatives, and, in any case, Ankara’s overarching policy is to diversify its suppliers.
Iraq generally, and northern Iraq in particular, offers
a very real energy prospect for Turkey, whose aspiration to develop as an energy hub, where energy can be
stored, refined, traded, and exported, reinforces Turkey’s interest in northern Iraq’s rich energy resources.
So, if Iraq continues along its present path, how
will Ankara square its declared commitment to Iraq’s
territorial integrity with its embrace of a de facto independent KRG? Given the uncertain future of its own
Kurdish problem, and the likely reaction of Iran in
particular, it is hard to imagine Turkey supporting an
Iraqi Kurdish declaration of independence. Even so, it
should be noted that in the early days of the Republic,
Ankara sought to incorporate within its own borders
the Ottoman province of Mosul, which included the
Kurdish populated areas of what later became Iraq. In
1925, the League of Nations found in favor of British
Iraq, but, at various junctures since then, Turks have
revisited the terms and indeed the justice of this outcome. For example, in 1986 Ankara apparently warned
the United States and Iran that it would demand the
return of Mosul and Kirkuk (in effect, the former Ottoman viliyet of Mosul) in the event of disorder in Iraq
as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq war.123 During the
first U.S.-led war against Iraq, President Turgut Ozal
mused about historic Turkish claims to the region in
the event of an Iraqi collapse.124 In May 1995, Turk47

ish President Suleyman Demirel proposed that the
border should be rectified in Turkey’s favor,125 and in
December 2003 expressed regret that Turkey had been
denied Mosul province in 1923.126 In August 2002, Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, admittedly a
member of the far right National Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi—MHP), chose to remark that Iraqi
Kurdistan had been “forcibly separated” from Turkey
at the time of the Republic’s formation in 1923, and that
Ankara retained a protective interest in the region.127
As U.S.-led military action against Iraq approached,
Abdullah Gul’s predecessor as foreign minister of
the new Justice and Development Party government,
Yasar Yakis, apparently sought legal clarification of
the status of Mosul and Kirkuk,128 while one of Turkey’s leading commentators pointed out that Mosul
and Kirkuk were ceded to Iraq, not to any Kurdish
state that might subsequently emerge.129 More recently, there have been unconfirmed reports that David
Petraeus, as Central Intelligence Agency chief, raised
with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan the possibility
of independence for the KRG.130
Turks today are fond of pointing out that Iraq,
and particularly its Kurdish north, is a neighbor with
which Turkey’s own security is interconnected and towards which Turkey cannot be indifferent. This is not
to predict that a Turkish annexation of northern Iraq is
on the horizon, but it helps to be reminded—not least
in the wake of the Soviet, Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian,
Indonesian (East Timor), and Sudanese redrawing
of state boundaries, not to mention the de facto and
Turkish-sponsored autonomy of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and in the context of the
countless territorial disputes currently raging around
the world—that the territorial legacies left behind by
Europe’s departing colonial powers were often insen48

sitive to demographic and geopolitical realities, and
need not necessarily endure indefinitely. Nowhere is
this truer than in the lands inhabited by ethnic Kurds.
The march of events can bring about unanticipated
outcomes, and in the Middle East in general, events
are undoubtedly on the march.
A more likely outcome, and one that is not necessarily a function of the make-up of Baghdad’s government, is that northern Iraq will evolve as a de facto
Turkish satellite and dependency. Geography, the
energy relationship, the shared transborder Kurdish
ethnicity, and the sheer pull of Turkey’s economic
dynamism, is likely to push the KRG into the arms
of Turkey, whether Baghdad resents it or not. Ambassador Riccardione’s comments, outlined at the
beginning of this monograph, envisage this outcome
occurring via a benign process in which the entirety
of Iraq economically, and maybe politically as well,
aligns itself with Turkey. On current trends, this looks
unlikely. Instead, the KRG’s dependency on Turkey
might come about as a consequence of Ankara’s and
Erbil’s shared frustration with Baghdad, and in the
face of its opposition—and presumably that of Washington, too.131 Some Iraqi Kurds, especially from the
PUK, would be uneasy about such an outcome.132 Yet
others are even prepared to speculate about a de facto
or de jure “Turkish-Kurdish” federation of some kind,
at least as a distant possibility.133 There is scope for
greater integration of the economies of Iraq’s Kurdish north and Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, and many
Turkish Kurds have already benefitted from the economic opportunities across the border. The construction of the mooted gas and oil pipelines into Turkey
would constitute part of this overall arrangement.
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A Turkish Kurdistan?
The Turkish case is still more difficult to think
through, but developments in Syria and hopes for
the future relationship with the KRG have, in recent
months, driven Ankara to embark on yet another
domestic Kurdish initiative, dubbed the “Imrali process” because it has involved negotiations with the
PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who is incarcerated on
a Turkish island of that name. Following a complex
series of behind-the-scenes consultations, a message
from Ocalan was read out at the Kurdish new year, or
Newroz, gathering on March 21, 2013, in Diyarbakir,134
in which he declared that “we have now arrived at
the stage of withdrawing our armed forces outside the
borders.”135 On May 8, PKK fighters did begin to trek
through the mountains to their northern Iraqi bases—
seen in Baghdad as a slight on Iraqi territory136—but
Ocalan’s address made no direct mention of what concessions Ankara had made in return. Nor has Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan been at all forthcoming,
although it is for his government to initiate the next
phase of the process. At the time of writing, no details
of what this might look like had yet emerged.
In fact, there are few indications that the prime
minister will be willing or able to meet Kurdish expectations. Although these remain largely unspecified,
they are believed to include Ocalan’s release or transfer to house arrest—something that Erdogan has specifically denied he has agreed to; the winding down of
the so-called “village guard” system of governmentsponsored and armed Kurdish citizens; the release of
the thousands of Koma Civakên Kurdistan activists currently held in detention; a reform of Turkey’s notorious anti-terror laws that are frequently used against
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political activists thought to be sympathetic to the
Kurdish cause; education in Kurdish; establishing
Kurdish as co-equal with Turkish as an official language of the Republic; the replacement of the current
ethnic definition of citizenship with a civic one; an end
to the 10 percent electoral hurdle for parliamentary
representation; and, above all, some kind of devolution, self-determination, or “democratic autonomy”
that would, in effect, introduce something tantamount
to a federal political system in Turkey.137 There appear
to be few indications that Erdogan, his party, the opposition parties, or public opinion, are at all ready to
concede many, if any, of these demands. Erdogan appears to think in terms of an Islamic “brotherhood”
between Turkey’s Turkish and Kurdish citizens, and
appears not to recognize the pressure to embrace the
pluralism that is inherent in Kurdish ethnic identity
demands.138 Furthermore, the behavior and rhetoric of
the government during the “Gezi Park” protests that
erupted in spring 2013 hardly suggested that it is set
firmly on a course of further democratization, reform
and inclusiveness.
Unsurprisingly, then, at the time of this writing,
there is disquiet among some Kurdish leaders. In addition to impatience, voiced by Ocalan among others,
at the government’s somewhat tardy response in the
wake of the PKK cross-border withdrawal,139 many
PKK fighters, led by their leader Murat Karayilan,
have been skeptical from the beginning.140 Indeed,
Karayilan has openly expressed his doubts regarding
Ankara’s sincerity and has warned of the possibility
of a renewed and even intensified war.141 At the June
2013 Kurdish gathering in Diyarbakir, Ahmet Turk, a
senior BDP figure, voiced similar doubts about Ankara’s intentions.142 It does indeed seem unrealistic to as-
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sume that so long and bitter a conflict can be overcome
easily or quickly, and without considerable sacrifice
on the government side also. In short, a satisfactory
outcome to the process should not at all be taken for
granted. The major obstacles are still to be overcome.
A case can even be made that neither the government
nor the PKK are in great need of a settlement. Each
deeply mistrusts the other. The PKK remains able to
recruit and raise funds, might reasonably feel that
time is on its side in light of the wider developments
in the region, and will seek to preserve its legitimacy.
For his part, Erdogan runs the risk of incurring the
wrath of Turkish nationalist sentiment, of seeming to
legitimize Ocalan and the PKK, and of the initiative’s
failure. Nor is it necessarily the case that Ocalan, for
all the status and symbolic significance he undoubtedly possesses, entertains aspirations that precisely
accord with all elements of Turkey’s wider Kurdish
movement.143
The Turkish state retains the capacity to sustain
a crackdown on the PKK inside its own borders and
in northern Iraq. Of course, negotiations that lead to
some kind of Kurdish autonomy in Turkey could also
evolve, although that hardly seems to be what Prime
Minister Erdogan currently has in mind. It might
even transpire that Turkey’s Kurds would be satisfied
with little more than some relaxation of the cultural
and language restrictions currently in force, which
appears to be all that Ankara has in mind. Greater
contact and interaction with a Turkey-leaning KRG
might prove sufficient, not least as a consequence of
economic benefits that might accrue. However, such
an outcome would represent little return on decades
of violent struggle against a very repressive and determined Turkish regime. Either the government needs
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to show willingness to go the extra mile in return for a
lasting solution—which would probably need to consist chiefly of some kind of devolved government—or
the struggle will surely continue.
If that occurs, what would the implications be for
Ankara’s relationship with the KRG? No doubt recalling earlier clashes with the PKK, such as during
the mid-1990s, Barzani is wary of the expanded PKK
presence on KRG territory that is a consequence of the
“Imrali process,” seeing it as a potential rival and as
posing the risk of intensified Turkish military activity
inside KRG territory should the process be derailed.144
There is at least an outside possibility that failure of
the “Imrali process” could result in heightened tension between Erbil and the PKK, particularly if that
failure could be attributed to the PKK. This scenario
would be still more probable in the event of tension
between Erbil and a PYD-dominated autonomous
Kurdish zone in Syria. On the other hand, should
Ankara take the blame for a renewal of the struggle
against the PKK and a denial of Kurdish rights in
Turkey, Barzani would find himself under domestic
pressure to distance the KRG from Ankara—pressure
that Tehran, and perhaps the PUK, too, would seek
to exploit. Turkey’s relationship with Iraq’s Kurds is
conducted more through Barzani’s KDP than through
the PUK, which historically has been relatively open
to Iranian influence. The KRG is by no means a unified
entity. The PUK is, in general, less enamored of the
KRG’s new relationship with Turkey, more accommodating towards Baghdad, and closer than is the KDP
to Syria’s PYD.
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An Iranian Kurdistan?
Iran’s Kurds are at least as geographically dispersed, politically fragmented, and cowed as their
Syrian counterparts have been, and are even more understudied.145 Since 2004, Iran, like Turkey, has been
in a struggle with Kurdish fighters operating from
Iraqi Kurdish territory, in the form of the Party for
Life and Freedom in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a
Kurdistane—PJAK). Like Syria’s PYD, PJAK is widely
assumed to be affiliated with the PKK. In the past, Ankara has cooperated with Iran against the PKK/PJAK
threat from northern Iraq. Iran also suspects that PJAK
is or was sponsored by the United States as a means
to destabilize the Iranian regime. Certainly during the
autumn of 2011, as the American withdrawal from
Iraq approached, PJAK seemed to be on the lookout
for a truce with Tehran. This eased the task of the KRG
officials who helped broker the first ever ceasefire between PJAK and Iranian forces, which came into effect
in September 2011, following an intensified summer
campaign against PJAK by Tehran’s security forces.146
However, given the KRG’s autonomy, the establishment of a Kurdish self-governing zone in Syria, and
the “Imrali process” in Turkey, Tehran must be feeling
isolated and its ethnic Kurds left behind by the progress being made by their kin in neighboring countries.
They could conceivably be inspired to emulate them.147
Such is Iranian Kurdish disunity, however, that attempting prediction is ill-advised, although recently
there have been attempts to forge greater unity.148 In
the past, Kurdish challenges in Iran have tended to
materialize at moments of crisis in the country. An attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, or an implosion of
the regime there, could lead to a scenario resembling
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that currently at play in Syria and that has created the
current Iraqi situation, in which Kurdish elements
could seek to exploit the chaos in order to establish
some autonomy.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The pathway to a fully independent and pan-Kurdish state is hard to visualize. The geographical location and the history of the Kurds, inside and outside
Iraq, are unenviable. For Iraq’s Kurds, in the absence
of a functional government in Baghdad or of an Iran
fully integrated into the regional and global system, a
close embrace by an economically and politically dynamic Turkey, which can offer markets, investment,
protection, and diplomatic connectedness, might not
be the worst possible outcome, though it too would
undoubtedly bring challenges.149 Syria’s Kurds could
conceivably take a similar route. Of course, the road
to any such outcome is strewn with risks and obstacles. Iran could object, but its protests might be stifled
by the prize of preponderant influence in Shia Iraq.
Tehran might also be appeased by Turkish and Iraqi
Kurdish cooperation with respect to its own Kurdish difficulties. Baghdad, too, might be unhappy, but
there would be little it could do in the face of Erbil’s
economic and political dependency on a Turkey determined to tighten its hold over Iraq’s north. In fact,
arguably a bigger risk for Iraq’s Kurds would be the
risk of a cooling of the Ankara-Erbil relationship as
a result of developments in Syria’s Kurdish lands, or
of intra-Kurdish tensions that undermine the political
cohesion of the KRG. It is possible—even likely—that
splits within the Syrian and indeed Iranian Kurdish
movements—splits that could appear in Turkey, too,
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if and when a political process there gets fully underway,150—could magnify the divisions inside the KRG
between the PUK and the KDP. If the PYD retains its
current ascendency in Syrian Kurdistan and is able to
use it to enhance Kurdish autonomy—both of which
are quite likely—then a great deal will depend on factors such as whether the PYD actively supports the
PKK, whether Turkey is able to make such profound
political progress that it leads to the effective disarmament of the PKK and the end of its violent struggle
against Turkey’s security forces, and whether Barzani—or good sense—is able to steer Syria’s Kurds
away from confrontation with Turkey in a manner
that reassures Ankara. Much also depends on what
kind of post-Assad regime emerges in Damascus and
how its relationship with the country’s Kurds evolves.
Another possibility is that there could be some kind of
fusion between Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish autonomous
entities, although this, too, would depend on the fortunes of the PYD in Syria and its relationship with
the KRG.
However, it is clear that whatever transpires in
Syria and whatever path the latest “Kurdish opening”
in Turkey takes, the Kurds will have the capacity to
deny stability to each of the countries in which they
reside for so long as their aspirations are not considered. This applies to Iraq as well. In the seemingly unlikely event that the Arab politics of Iraq stabilize to
such a degree that a more sustained onslaught against
Kurdish autonomy can be mounted, the Kurds would
undoubtedly resist and a bloodbath would ensue, the
outcome and ramifications of which would be highly
uncertain. Would Turkey seriously intervene on behalf
of the KRG, as has been rumored it might? How would
Washington, which bears heavy responsibility for the

56

state of affairs in Iraq and which is currently arming
Baghdad, react? How would Tehran react? In short, in
today’s fast-moving regional environment, it is more
difficult than ever to predict the future for the Kurds
of Iraq, or indeed of the wider region. Washington’s
ally, Turkey, finds itself torn between its vulnerability to the turmoil in its neighborhood, and a desire to
act in order to change it, possibly dramatically. However, recent developments suggest that, whatever the
future holds, it is very unlikely to resemble the past.
Washington will determine for itself how actively it
will engage in trying to shape that future. It will be
less able to choose for itself how much that future impinges on its interests and preferences in the region.
Recommendations to U.S. Policymakers:
•	
Be more proactive in helping resolve the
KRG-Baghdad relationship, in particular with
respect to agreement on a hydrocarbons law.
This would enable KRG energy resources to be
exported to and through Turkey.
•	
Encourage Ankara and Baghdad to improve
their relationship, and especially to explore
the possibility of a north-south energy pipeline
in Iraq.
•	
Encourage Prime Minister Maliki to adopt more
inclusive and less confrontational policies towards the country’s Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and
even its other Shia groups, so that Iraq can consolidate its democracy and achieve stability.
•	Make rearming Iraq, especially the sale of
F-16s, dependent on Baghdad adopting more
conciliatory and inclusive domestic policies.
•	
In the event of a failure to improve relation-
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ships in the region, consider the implications of
its commitment to the Maliki government for
U.S. relations with Turkey and the KRG, and
for the development of Iraq’s energy resources.
•	
Prepare for the possibility that Syria and/or
Iraq might fragment or descend into continued
chaos, thereby potentially pushing Iraqi and
Syrian Kurds into the Turkish orbit.
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